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Since the Berkshire County decision, courts have been obligated to
vouchsafe national banks from the reach of state coffers. It was observed
in Berkshire County:
Because of § 548 and its legislative history, we are con-
vinced that if a change is to be made in state taxation of national
banks, it must come from the Congress, which has established
the present limits.48
If anyone is to act in reversing the policy of according tax-free treatment
to national banks49 it must, indeed, be the Congress, for the courts have
shown that they are unwilling to respond to change conditions in this area.
MICHAEL BRUCE SOLOMON
ONE PARTY'S CONSENT TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE'
The defendant was a uniformed police officer who suggested to one
Matthews, an employee of Wells Fargo Armored Service, that he allow
the defendant and "pros" to "hold him up" with the understanding that
no one would be hurt and that Matthews would get a share of the money.
Matthews reported the proposition to his employer and the F.B.I., who
persuaded him to pretend to acquiesce in the defendant's plan. Matthews
arranged to meet the defendant and the "pro" at the Orange Bowl. The
police and the F.B.I. put a microphone and transmitter on the person of
Matthews and sent him to the meeting equipped to record the conver-
sations of the parties. Thereafter, there were numerous telephone con-
versations between the defendant and Matthews in which the proposed
robbery was discussed. These conversations were recorded by the police
with the knowledge and consent of Matthews.
Subsequently the robbery took place. The numerous police officers
who had staked out the scene of the robbery apprehended the defendant.
The defendant was adjudicated guilty pursuant to a jury verdict. On
appeal, the District Court of Appeal, for the state of Florida, Third Dis-
trict, held, affirmed: An incriminating recording received from electronic
48. 392 U.S. 339, 346 (1968).
49. Comptroller Fred 0. Dickinson, shortly after the Supreme Court affirmance, sent
a resolution to the Florida Congressional Delegation which expressed, in part, the following:
In these days of rising costs and increased demand for public services, Florida
can ill afford to lose even a penny in revenue much less the millions of dollars
that would be taken away if needed legislation [is] not passed.
It [the legislation] means that national banks will not be discriminated against,
but at the same time they will no longer enjoy immunity from state and local taxes.
Miami Review, Mar. 6, 1969, at 16, col. 1.
See also address by Hon. Ralph Turlington, Speaker of the House, Fla. Legislature,
Aug. 22, 1969, calling for federal legislation permitting states to tax national banks. Senator
Spessard Holland of Florida has recently also called for federal legislation either modifying
or repealing 12 U.S.C. § 548.
CASES NOTED
surveillance equipment upon the person of a consenting party to a con-
versation is admissible in evidence, as is such a recording obtained as the
result of a wiretap on the telephone of one consenting conversant.
Walker v. State, 222 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
At the trial, the numerous tape recordings introduced into evidence
fell mainly into two general categories: (1) the recordings made at the
Orange Bowl, for which the State's witness carried a hidden microphone,
and (2) the telephone conversations between the witness, Matthews, and
the defendant, recorded at Matthews' home. Matthews took the stand
and testified as to these conversations. Each of the types of recorded
conversations involved in Walker has been considered by the United
States Supreme Court in landmark cases which support the result reached
by the court in the instant case.
Lopez v. United States' involved a "wired" informer. The crux of
the opinion allowing into evidence the recorded conversation thus ob-
tained was stated by the Court as follows:
Once it is plain that [the agent] could properly testify about
his conversation with [the defendant], the constitutional claim
relating to the recording of that conversation emerges in per-
spective . . . . [The device] was carried in and out by an
agent who was there with petitioner's assent and it neither saw
nor heard more than the agent himself.
Stripped to its essentials, petitioner's argument amounts to
saying that he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws
in the agent's credibility without being beset by corroborating
evidence ....
Indeed, there has ,not even been any electronic eavesdrop-
ping on a private conversation which government agents could
not otherwise have overheard.2
In essence, the Supreme Court has enunciated a principle that re-
corded conversations were properly admissible as corroborative evidence.
That principle has been recognized by the Florida courts as well.' The
same reasoning was properly applied in the case at bar, where the tape
recordings served to corroborate the testimony of the witness, Matthews.
The leading case dealing with recorded telephone conversations is
Rathburn v. United States. In that case the police were allowed to testify
that they heard the defendant make a threat while listening to a tele-
1. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
2. Id. at 438-40.
3. In Florida, where the conversation has been recorded and the recording made
with the consent of one of the parties to the conversation, even though the con-
senting party is an undercover agent, such conversation is admissible . . . . This
is particularly true when the recording is used to corroborate testimony of a
consenting party to the recording.
Parnell v. State, 218 So.2d 535, 541 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). See also Koran v. State, 213
So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Hajdu v. State, 189 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
4. 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
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phone conversation between the defendant and another person, who had
consented to the police listening over a regularly used telephone extension.
The Court held that the contents of a conversation are admissible in
court since such an overhearing does not violate section 605 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act. The Act provides that no person not being au-
thorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge its
existence or contents. The Court stated:
The clear inference [of § 6051 is that one entitled to re-
,ceive the communication may use it for his own benefit or have
another use it for him. The communication itself is not priv-
ileged, and one party may not force the other to secrecy merely
by using a telephone. . . . [E]ither party may record the con-
versation and publish it ....
I.. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk
that the other party may have an extension telephone and may
allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes
place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the
parties may complain. Consequently, one element of § 605, in-
terception, has not occurred.'
In the instant case, the State's chief witness could have, and did,
testify to what he heard. To have excluded these conversations on the
ground they were tape recorded would "amount to straining at a gnat
while swallowing a camel.""
These cases have been and remain good law. A Florida case on this
issue, Lee v. Florida,7 distinguishes them factually but in no way alters
the rule. In that case the defendant was a user of a party line (due to
local inefficiency rather than choice). The police tapped the same party
line in a neighboring house. The parties to the recorded conversations
neither knew they were being recorded nor consented thereto. The Su-
preme Court recognizd that a party line user's privacy is vulnerable,
but "[ilt does not necessarily follow that his telephone communications
are completely unprotected by § 605." The Court distinguished the facts
of the case and limited its holding: "What was done here was a far cry
from the police activity in Rathburn. . . ."I By contrast, Rathburn is
virtually indistinguishable from the instant case.
5. Id. at 110, 111 (emphasis by the court). See Barber v. State, 172 So.2d 857 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1965).
Prior to the adoption of section 605 and the judicial interpretations thereof, the same re-
sult was arrived at in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), wherein it was held
that wiretapping was not violative of either the fourth or fifth amendments. Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act was enacted to lessen the effect of that decision. See
David v. United States, 5 Crim. L. Rptr. 2364 (5th Cir. July 5, 1969).
The constitutional issues in Florida were discussed in Griffith v. State, 111 So.2d 282
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1959). This case indicated by dictum that wiretapping may well be a violation
of those rights guaranteed by the Florida Declaration of Rights, both as an unreasonable
search and seizure and as self-incrimination. This view, however, has not been followed.
6. Barber v. State, 172 So.2d 857, 860 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
7. 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
8. Id. at 381n.5.
9. Id. at 381.
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Cases considering the various implications of "wiretapping" and
electronic surveillance are of current importance, and there have been
a number of recent decisions which merit consideration. In Katz v.
United States10 the Supreme Court reversed a case in which the Govern-
ment was permitted to introduce into evidence the petitioner's end of
telephone conversations overheard by F.B.I. agents who had attached
electronic listening and recording devices to the outside of the public
phone booth from which he had placed his calls. The Court held that
the reach of the fourth amendment can no longer turn upon the presence
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. This con-
clusion was expressed as follows:
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."
Apparently words are protected by the fourth amendment without any
requirement of trespass. The decision was a proper one considering the
invasion of privacy involved and the lack of consent by either party. 2
Since Katz, several courts of appeals have considered similar sit-
uations. A divided United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held in United States v. White'" that Katz effectively overruled
On Lee v. United States.'4 In White, incriminating conversations were
transmitted to narcotics agents from a suspect's home, automobile, and
10. 389 U.S. 347 (1968). Since pre-Katz decisions did not hold nontrespassory eaves-
dropping unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held Katz to be entirely prospective in Desist
v. United States,-U.S.-, 89 S. Ct. 1030 (1969). Although it is the author's contention that
Katz is not applicable to the case under consideration, even if it were the surveillance con-
ducted in the principal case occurred in April, 1967, prior to the cut-off date for retroactivity
of December 18, 1967.
11. 389 U.S. at 353.
12. To view the decision in its proper perspective, a cogent portion of a separate con-
curring opinion by Mr. Justice White is extremely helpful:
In previous cases, which are undisturbed by today's decision, the Court has upheld,
as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, admission at trial of evidence obtained
(1) by an undercover police agent to whom a defendant speaks without knowledge
that he is in the employ of the police Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 . . . ;
(2) by a recording device hidden on the person of such an informant, Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 . . . ; and (3) by a policeman listening to the secret
micro-wave transmissions of an agent conversing with the defendant in another
location, On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 . . . . When one man speaks to
another he takes all the risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including the risk
that the man to whom he speaks will make public what he has heard. The Fourth
Amendment does not protect against unreliable (or law abiding) associates. Hoffa
v. United States, supra. It is but a logical and reasonable extention of this principle
that a man takes the risk that his hearer, free to memorize what he hears for later
verbatim repetitions, is instead recording it or transmitting it to another. The present
case deals with an entirely different situation, for as the Court emphasizes the peti-
tioner "sought to exclude . . . . the uninvited ear," and spoke under circumstances
in which a reasonable person would assume that uninvited ears were not listening.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 (1967).
13. 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969).
14. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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place of business, by means of an electronic device attached to an in-
former who accompanied him. Writing for the three dissenters, Castle,
C.J., emphasized that Mr. Justice White, who concurred in Katz, re-
garded On Lee as "undisturbed" by that decision. 15 Chief Judge Castle
maintained that there is all the difference in the world between the search
and seizure which was involved in Katz, and the misplaced confidence
in this case.' 6 A separate dissenting view relied on the "rather old-
fashioned view that only the Supreme Court could set aside its hold-
ings. M17
On Lee 8 of course, is itself distinguishable from the principal case
because the transmitted conversation was obtained after the defendant's
arraignment and was not used as corroborative evidence, since the agent
did not testify. The court in White had a more difficult time with Lopez
v. United States, 9 admitting that "[t]he important distinction between
Lopez and this case is that here the informer . . . was not produced
whereas in Lopez, the Government agent was a witness .... "20 Thus
the scope of the White case is evidently rather limited and certainly
inapplicable to the instant case.
Perhaps the better reasoned case, following White by a week, is
United States v. Kaufer .' The court deemed the overhearing of an in-
criminating telephone conversation between the suspect and the agent-
informer by another agent who listened in on an extension to be outside
the purview of Katz. The court stated:
Katz v. United States ... has no application to this case. Katz
involved electronic surveillance performed without the knowl-
edge of any of the participants in the intercepted conversation.
The procedure used against Kaufer involved the recording of
a conversation with the consent of one of the parties to that
conversation, a procedure upheld in Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963). A recording here, as distinguished from that
in Katz, merely serves to preserve the consenting participant's
recollection. . . . The risk that an unknown third party will
intercept and record the conversation, as was done in Katz, is
obviously of a far different order. The cases are thus clearly
distinguishable, and it cannot be said, as appellant urges, that
Lopez has been overruled, sub silentio, by Katz.. . . We are not
persuaded by the contrary majority opinion of the Court of Ap-
15. 405 F.2d 838, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
16. Id. at 850, citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). The judge also dis-
cussed Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) and Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966). Id. at 849.
17. 405 F.2d at 852 (dissenting opinion of Hastings, J.).
18. 343 U.S. 743 (1951).
19. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
20. 405 F.2d at 847.
21. 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1969).
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peals for the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc in United States
v. White, decided January 7, 1969, by a divided court.
22
Also urged as grounds for reversal in Walker v. State,28 but lightly
dismissed by the court, was the fact that there were over 150 parts of
the tape recording wherein the conversation was unintelligible.24 Brady
v. State25 makes it clear that partially inaudible and unintelligible re-
cordings are nonetheless admissible. Impliedly, the criterion is the dis-
cretion of the trial judge as to the trustworthiness of the recordings.2"
Although it is not mandatory, the better procedure for determining
relevancy, not intelligibility, is for the trial judge to review the tapes.27
As to intelligibility:
It has been universally held that because portions of a recording
are unintelligible is no basis for keeping the intelligible part out.
A partial incompleteness of a recording may be used by the de-
fense as a factor to be considered by the jury when determining
what value to place on the recordings.
28
It thus appears that the instant decision is wholly in accord with
the growing body of case law. Hopefully, it will represent the standard
-a fair balance between the protection of individual freedom and the
necessities of modern law enforcement-when the remaining questions
and areas of confusion are ultimately resolved.
The instant decision permits evidence received by means of elec-
tronic devices, but does so with certain enumerated limitations, i.e., cor-
roborative testimony and a consenting conversant. 29 This should be as
far as the courts will go if they are to remain within the already defined
constitutional guidelines. The individual is, after all, entitled to know
that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. As Mr.
Justice Brennan recognized in his dissenting opinion in Lopez v. United
States:
22. Id. at 551, 552. That this is the view of the Fifth Circuit is apparent in Dancy v.
United States, 390 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1968).
23. 222 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
24. Id.
25. 178 So.2d 121 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
26. The requirements for admissibility, set forth in Gomein v. State, 172 So.2d 511
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), were met. These include testimony as to the accuracy of the recording
and identification of the defendant's voice.
27. Gomein v. State, 172 So.2d 511, 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
28. Id. at 515.
29. See Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-17, which enacts a comprehensive wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance law nearly identical to Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. 1969). Both acts authorize the inter-
ception and disclosure of oral and wire communications by "a party to the communication or
[when] one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such inter-
ception." Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-17, § 3 (2) (c), (d); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2) (c), (d) (Supp.
1969).
Thus, neither enactment works any change in the case law with respect to consensual
"taps" or "bugs" but merely codifies judicial decision on the point.
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Electronic surveillance strikes deeper than at the ancient feeling
that a man's home is his castle; it strikes at freedom of com-
munication, a postulate of our kind of society.'
Any electronic surveillance hereafter permitted must fall within the
rigid limitations recognized in the instant case or must be a product of
an antecedent order judicially sanctioning such intrusion. If these guide-
lines are adhered to the rights of the individual will be protected in our
modern society.
ALAN S. BECKER
THE PRIVILEGE TO REMAIN SILENT AND THE
PRESUMPTION OF LARCENY BASED ON
UNEXPLAINED POSSESSION
Based upon stolen goods found in his possession, the defendant,
who did not take the stand, was convicted of breaking and entering
with intent to steal following the court's instruction to the jury that
unexplained possession of such goods was a fact from which the de-
fendant's guilt might be inferred. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, reversed and remanded on the grounds that the Miranda
decision precluded such an instruction as a violation of the accused's
constitutional privilege to remain silent, and that the privilege would
be valueless if the defendant's silence might be used against him at
the trial.' On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, quashed
and remanded: The Miranda decision discussed an accused's silence
in the face of custodial interrogation, not a defendant's failure to
testify at trial. In the instant case, the defendant was free to testify
or remain silent, since the instruction concerned the fact of possession
as circumstantial evidence of guilt (a fact that the defendant could
rebut through explanation), not his silence per se. State v. Young,
217 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1968).
The Fifth Amendment's prohibition of compulsory self-incrim-
ination applies to the states through incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.' Unexplained possession of recently
stolen property is an inference of fact which the jury may either weigh
as evidence of guilt or find as sufficient evidence to support convic-
tion, depending on the rule applicable in the given jurisdiction.' The
court may generally so instruct the jury.' A majority of courts faced
with a self-incrimination challenge to the presumption of guilt based
30. Lopez v. United States, 347 U.S. 427 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
1. Young v. State, 203 So.2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
2. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. 3 H. UNDERHILL, CRnsaNAL EVIDENCE § 601 (5th ed. 1957).
4. 1 F. WHARToN, CareN'AL EVIDENCE § 146 (12th ed. 1955).
